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Abstract 
In this paper, I focus on the concept of Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path 
(NEPIP) to examine the nature of the transition path to steady state after a shock that 
generates a severe recession. Risk-averse and non-cooperative households strategically 
and rationally choose a NEPIP if a shock that widely shifts the steady state downwards 
occurs. Because NEPIPs are not Pareto efficient, an infinite number of transition paths 
can be NEPIPs, but a unique NEPIP is eventually selected from among many possible 
NEPIPs by households through a tug of war between their preference to avoid a worst-
case scenario and the expected utility.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Severe recessions like the Great Recession and the Great Depression persist for several 
years or more (Temin, 1989; Martin et al., 2015; Hall, 2016; Fernald et al., 2017), 
probably because it takes time to reach the posterior steady state after a shock that 
changed the steady state and generated the severe recession. Although the cause of severe 
recessions has long been studied from various points of view (Temin, 1989; Hall, 2011; 
Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012; Mian and Sufi, 2012; Christiano et al., 2015; Martin et 
al., 2015; Guerrieri and Lorenzoni, 2017), no consensus about the cause has yet been 
reached. Because the cause remains unresolved, discussions about severe recessions have 
generally focused only on the cause, whereas the nature of the transition path to the 
posterior steady state during a severe recession has hardly been studied. Because the 
nature of the transition path will differ greatly, depending on the cause, researchers may 
have thought it would be fruitless to study the nature of the transition path in detail before 
knowing the cause.    
 Harashima (2016) showed a cause of the Great Recession that was based on the 
concept of a “Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path” (NEPIP). This concept is also 
shown in other papers by Harashima (2004, 2009, 2017, 2018a) and enables us to explain 
a mechanism for why a Pareto inefficient path is rationally chosen by households. If such 
a Pareto inefficient path is rationally chosen, phenomena like the Great Recession and 
Great Depression can be generated. An important feature of NEPIP is that it does not 
require a sudden huge technological regression or persisting rigidities in price adjustment 
processes to explain the generation of severe recessions.  
 In this paper, the nature of the transition path is examined on the basis of NEPIP. 
Risk-averse and non-cooperative households strategically and rationally choose a NEPIP 
if a shock that widely shifts the steady state downwards occurs. However, because NEPIP 
is not Pareto efficient—that is, because the constraint that Pareto efficiency should be 
kept does not exist—an infinite number of transition paths can be NEPIPs. The main 
purpose of this paper is to answer the question: How do households select a NEPIP from 
among many possible NEPIPs?  
 Households choose a NEPIP instead of the Pareto efficient saddle path 
strategically and rationally, by considering various possible options. A reason for not 
choosing the Pareto efficient saddle path in the first place is that a household dislikes, 
fears and avoids a worst-case scenario (hereafter, called “worst-case aversion”), and the 
selection of a NEPIP from among many possible NEPIPs will be also made considering 
this same household preference. In this paper, I show that households that possess worst-
case aversion eventually select a unique NEPIP by calculating optimality on the basis of 
(1) the expected utility from consumption and (2) the expected probability that the 
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foremost household (the household that first makes a decision) will be followed by all the 
other households.  
 As Harashima (2018b, 2019) showed, the NEPIP phenomenon can be 
equivalently explained on the basis of the concept of the MDC (maximum degree of 
comfortability)-based procedure. However, in this paper, I examine the nature of NEPIP 
on the basis of the model under the RTP (rate of time preference)-based procedure shown 
by Harashima (2004, 2009, 2017, 2018a).  
 
2  NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF A PARETO 
INEFFICIENT PATH (NEPIP) 
 
The mechanism and nature of NEPIP shown by Harashima (2004, 2009, 2017, 2018a) are 
briefly explained in this section. 
 
2.1  The model 
Households are assumed to be non-cooperative, risk averse, and infinitely living. They 
are also assumed to be identical in the sense that their preferences, labor incomes, and 
initial financial assets are identical. In addition, there is assumed to be a sufficiently large 
number of them. Each household maximizes its expected utility 
 
𝐸 ∫ 𝑢(𝑐𝑡)exp
∞
0
(−𝜃𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
 
subject to 
 
𝑑𝑘𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓′(𝐴, 𝑘𝑡) − 𝑐𝑡 
 
where ct, kt, and yt are consumption, capital, and production per capita in period t, 
respectively; A is technology; θ (> 0) is the rate of time preference (RTP); u is the utility 
function; 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐴, 𝑘𝑡) is the production function; and E is the expectation operator.  
 Suppose that there is a shock that makes the RTP of a household shift upward 
(i.e., increase) in period t = 0. After the shock, the steady state is changed from the prior 
(original) one to the posterior one. There are two options for each household with regard 
to consumption just after the shock. The first is a jump option J, in which a household’s 
consumption jumps upwards and then proceeds on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle 
path to the posterior steady state. The second is a non-jump option NJ, in which a 
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household’s consumption does not jump but instead gradually decreases from the prior 
steady state to the posterior steady state. This transition path is not Pareto efficient. The 
household that chose the NJ option reaches the posterior steady state in period s (≥0). The 
difference in consumption between the two options in period t is bt (≥ 0). The existence 
of bt indicates that unutilized resources and excess capital exist, and they have to be 
somehow eliminated.  
 The probability that households choose option NJ will not necessarily be low 
because option J requires a discontinuous large and sudden increase in consumption, but 
risk-averse households intrinsically dislike this type of discontinuous change in 
consumption and want to smooth the stream of consumption. The expected utility of a 
household after the shock depends on whether the household chooses option J or NJ. Let 
Jalone indicate that a household chooses the J option but other households choose the 
NJ option, NJalone indicate that the household chooses the NJ option but other 
households choose the J option, Jtogether indicate that all households choose the J 
option, and NJtogether indicate that all households choose the NJ option. Let p (0 ≤ p ≤ 
1) be the subjective probability of a household that the other households choose the J 
option. With p, the expected utility of the household when it chooses option J is  
 
E(J) = pE(Jtogether) + (1 – p)E(Jalone) , 
 
and when it chooses option NJ is 
 
E(NJ) = pE(NJalone) + (1 – p)E(NJtogether) , 
 
where E(Jalone), E(NJalone), E(Jtogether), and E(NJtogether) are the expected utilities 
of the household when choosing Jalone, NJalone, Jtogether, and NJtogether, 
respectively. A household determines whether to choose option J or NJ by strategically 
considering other households’ choices.  
 
2.2  The existence of NEPIP 
Harashima (2009, 2018a) proved that, under reasonable conditions, there is a p* (0 ≤ p* ≤ 
1) such that if p = p*, E(J) – E(NJ) = 0, and if p < p*, E(J) – E(NJ) < 0. That is, it is 
possible that a Pareto inefficient path (i.e., a NEPIP) can be rationally chosen by 
households.  
 Suppose that there are 𝐻(∈ 𝑁) identical households in the economy and H is 
sufficiently large. Households’ strategic choices between options J and NJ are well 
described by a Η-dimensional symmetric mixed strategy game. Let qη (0 ≤ qη ≤ 1) be the 
probability that a household 𝜂(∈ 𝑁) chooses option J. Harashima (2009, 2018a) showed 
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that strategy profiles  
 
(q1,q2,…,qH) = {(1,1,…,1), (p*, p*, …, p*), (0,0,…,0)} 
 
are Nash equilibria of this game.  
 
2.3  The preference of worst-case aversion 
As shown by Harashima (2009, 2018a), refinements of the Nash equilibrium are required 
to determine which Nash equilibrium, NJtogether (0,0,…,0) or Jtogether (1,1,…,1), is 
dominant, and these refinements necessitate additional criteria. If households are worst-
case averse in the sense that they prefer to avoid options that include the worst-case 
scenario when its probability is not known, they suppose a very low p and select the 
NJtogether (0,0,…,0) equilibrium (i.e., a NEPIP), because Jtogether is the best choice 
in the sense of the amount of payoff, followed by NJalone and NJtogether, whereas 
Jalone is the worst. The outcomes of choosing option J are more dispersed than those of 
choosing option NJ. If households are worst-case averse in the above-mentioned sense, a 
household will prefer option NJ that does not include the worst-case scenario Jalone, 
because it fears the worst-case scenario that, after the shock, it alone will substantially 
increase consumption while the other households will substantially decrease consumption. 
This behavior is rational because it is consistent with the household’s preference.  
 
2.4  NEPIP and severe recessions 
Because NEPIP is Pareto inefficient and excess capital and bt exist, unutilized resources 
are successively generated and eliminated—that is, a recession is generated. In this 
situation, as Harashima (2012) showed, the unemployment rate rises by frictions in the 
job search and matching process. Note that Harashima (2014b) also showed the 
generation mechanism of the shock on RTP. The main underlying factor that generates 
this shock is that households need to generate an expected RTP under sustainable 
heterogeneity, as shown by Harashima (2014a, 2014b). 
 
3  SELECTION OF A NEPIP 
 
3.1  Possible NEPIPs 
Because NEPIPs are Pareto inefficient, an infinite number of possible ones can exist. On 
the other hand, it is highly likely that a NEPIP will not be a complex winding path but 
rather a simple monotonously decreasing path from the prior steady state to the posterior 
one, because risk-averse households dislike discontinuous change in consumption and 
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prefer to smooth it.  
 Let λ be the value that determines the shape of a simple monotonously decreasing 
path from the prior steady state to the path of the posterior one, such that if λ > 0, 
consumption declines to greater extent in the early periods and then gradually approaches 
the level at the posterior steady state; if λ = 0, it declines in a straight line to posterior 
steady state consumption; and if λ < 0, it declines a smaller amount in the early periods 
and more as time passes. Figure 1 shows the shapes of NEPIPs for a positive, zero, and 
negative λ, as well as the likely shape of the Pareto efficient saddle path. 
 
Figure 1: NEPIP paths 
   
 
 
NEPIP for a negative λ 
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c0 
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s
 
NEPIP for a positive λ 
NEPIP for λ = 0 
Pareto efficient saddle path 
ct 
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3.2  Features of NEPIP 
3.2.1  Expected utility 
Figure 1 indicates that, as the value of λ increases, consumption decreases in any period 
before s and therefore the expected utility decreases. Hence, as λ increases, households 
will be more hesitant to choose a NEPIP. Because all identical households equally 
become more hesitant and they all are aware of this tendency, they will equally suppose 
a higher p if λ increases from the point of view of expected utility. 
 
3.2.2  Worst-case aversion 
Since all households are identical and possess the preference of worst-case aversion, as 
discussed in Section 2.3, all households will equally suppose that they all prefer option 
NJ that does not include the worst-case scenario Jalone; therefore, all of them will 
suppose a low p and select the NJtogether (0,0,…,0) equilibrium, which is a NEPIP.  
 As λ increases, the NEPIP deviates more from the Pareto efficient saddle path 
(option J), and the worst-case scenario Jalone becomes even worse. Hence, as λ increases, 
households will have a greater preference for option NJ that does not include the worst-
case scenario Jalone. Therefore, as λ increases, households will equally suppose a lower 
p from the point of view of worst-case aversion. 
 
3.2.3  The foremost household and followers 
Even though all households are identical, as assumed in Section 2.1, they behave 
strategically by considering and expecting the other households’ possible actions and 
outcomes. Therefore, the choice of transition path after the shock may not necessarily be 
made simultaneously by all households. A household may wait to make its decision until 
observing other households’ decisions, where a decision here means choosing of a value 
of λ. However, at the same time, households cannot postpone decisions for a long 
period—they need to make a decision relatively soon after the shock. While each 
household is considering the others’ possible actions, a very small exogenous factor that 
is unrelated to preferences and heterogeneous to households will push one of the 
households forward. That is, a household (possibly even by accident) makes a decision 
(i.e., chooses a value of λ) and exhibits its decision to other households before any other 
household does. I call this household the “foremost household.”  
 All of the other households will make decisions by considering and evaluating 
the foremost household’s decision. I call these households “followers.” A follower will 
choose the same value of λ as that of the foremost household if it expects that many of 
the other followers will also make the same choice. From Section 3.2.1, we know that, 
from the point of view of expected utility, as the value of λ that the foremost household 
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chooses increases, the probability that all followers will choose the same value decreases.1 
On the other hand, from Section 3.2.2, we know that, from the point of view of the worst-
case aversion, as the foremost household’s value of λ increases, the probability that all 
followers will choose the same value of λ as the foremost household will also increase. 
That is, expected utility and worst-case aversion act in opposite directions. Whether 
followers choose the same value as that of the foremost household therefore depends on 
the relative difference in the strengths of these two opposing forces.  
 
3.2.4  The expected probability of following the NJ 
Taking the argument in Section 3.2.1 into consideration, the expected probability that all 
followers will make the same choice as that of the foremost household from the point of 
view of the expected utility can be most simply described by  
 
𝛱𝑈 = exp(−𝜇?̃?)                          (1) 
 
where ?̃? is the λ that the foremost household chose, and μ (> 0) is a constant. Equation 
(1) indicates that, as the value of ?̃? increases, ΠU decreases. On the other hand, taking 
the argument in Section 3.2.2 into consideration, the expected probability that all 
followers will make the same choice as that of the foremost household from the point of 
view of worst-case aversion can be most simply described by 
 
𝛱𝑅 = 1 − exp(−𝜈?̃?)                        (2) 
 
where ν (> 0) is a constant. Equation (2) indicates that, as the value of ?̃? increases, ΠR 
decreases. By equations (1) and (2), therefore, the combined expected probability that all 
followers will make the same choice as that of the foremost household from both points 
of view (Π) is  
 
𝛱 = 𝛱𝑈𝛱𝑅 = exp(−𝜇?̃?) − exp[−(𝜇 + 𝜈)?̃?] .              (3) 
 
Π indicates the initial expected probability that all other households make the same choice 
as the foremost household (Figure 2). The term “initial” is added because followers make 
their final decisions after considering not only equation (3) but also other related factors, 
as will be discussed below.  
                                                   
1 Under the MDC-based procedure shown by Harashima (2018b, 2019), as the value of λ chosen by the 
foremost household increases, the probability that all followers will choose the same value of λ decreases 
because of the higher level of discomfort caused by the destruction of resources, not because of lower 
expected utilities. 
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Figure 2: The initial expected probability that all followers will 
choose the same λ as the foremost household 
 
   
 
 A following household initially considers whether it should follow the foremost 
household on the basis of the initial expected probability (i.e., equation [3]). There will 
be a unique value of Π, 𝛱෩, such that, if 𝛱 > 𝛱෩, a follower always chooses the same 
value of λ as the foremost household (?̃?). In Figure 2, therefore, if ?̃? is located between 
?̃?1 and ?̃?2, a follower will always make the same choice as the foremost household. An 
important point is that the decisions of all followers eventually become identical, because 
all households are identical in the sense that they have identical preferences although they 
behave strategically, non-cooperatively, and independently. Hence, the consequence after 
the foremost household chooses ?̃? is either that all followers choose it or no follower 
does. Hence, the “eventual” expected probability that all followers make the same choice 
as the foremost household is   
 
 𝛱 = 1    if ?̃?1 ≤ ?̃? ≤ ?̃?2        
(4) 
𝛱 = 0    if ?̃? < ?̃?1 or ?̃?2 < ?̃? .                      
 
If ?̃?1 ≤ ?̃? ≤ ?̃?2, therefore, the NEPIP that the foremost household chose is selected as the 
𝝀෨𝟏 
𝝀෨  
1 
0 
𝜫෩ 
0 
𝝀෨𝟐 
Π 
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Nash equilibrium in an economy. 
 
3.3  Determination of a NEPIP 
Because all households are identical, they all generate the same eventual expected 
probability (equation [4]). Hence, any foremost household will choose ?̃? , giving 
sufficient consideration to equation (4). Because no household will follow the foremost 
household unless ?̃?1 ≤ ?̃? ≤ ?̃?2 , any ?̃? outside ?̃?1 ≤ ?̃? ≤ ?̃?2  will be harmful for any 
foremost household. Hence, any foremost household will choose only a ?̃? between ?̃?1 
and ?̃?2.  
 In addition, among the values of ?̃? located between ?̃?1  and ?̃?2 , the NEPIP 
with ?̃?1  gives the highest expected utility to the foremost household. Because any 
foremost household anticipates these consequences, it will generally choose ?̃?1 as ?̃?. As 
a result, the NEPIP with ?̃?1 will be generally chosen as the NEPIP in an economy.  
 
3.4  Simultaneous determination of the transition period 
In the previous sections, the transition period s is given exogenously, but it may be 
determined endogenously and simultaneously with ?̃?. It seems likely that households 
want to arrive at the posterior steady state as soon as possible. However, as s becomes 
shorter, μ in equation (1) will increase because the expected utility decreases as s 
decreases for any given value of λ. In other words, if the value of s is sufficiently small, 
there will be no value of ?̃? that makes 𝛱 > 𝛱෩ because of the corresponding larger value 
of μ. Therefore, there will be the critical value of s, ?̃?, such that if ?̃? ≤ 𝑠, then 𝛱 > 𝛱෩ 
for at least one value of ?̃? . That is, when 𝑠 = ?̃? , the curve of the initial expected 
probability that all followers will follow the foremost household comes in contact with 
the line of 𝛱෩, as shown in Figure 3.  
 Because all households are identical, all households know the value of ?̃?. In 
addition, because it seems likely that households want to arrive at the posterior steady 
state as soon as possible, any foremost household will choose ?̃? as s. As a result, the 
NEPIP with ?̃? and ?̃?1 will be generally chosen as the NEPIP in an economy.  
 
3.5  Nature of ?̃? 
By equation (3), the maximal of Π is obtained at  
 
𝜕𝛱
𝜕?̃?
=
𝜕exp(−𝜇?̃?)
𝜕?̃?
−
𝜕exp[−(𝜇 + 𝜈)?̃?]
𝜕?̃?
= 0 
 
and thereby at 
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?̃? = −
ln (
𝜇
𝜇 + 𝜈)
𝜈
 .  
 
Hence, if 
𝜕𝛱
𝜕𝜆෩
 = 0 at ?̃?1, then 
 
?̃?1 = −
ln (
𝜇
𝜇 + 𝜈)
𝜈
 .                                                   (5) 
 
Figure 3:    for   
 
   
 
 If the curve of the initial expected probability comes in contact with the line of 
𝛱෩ at ?̃?1 as shown in Figure 3, then by equation (3), 
 
𝛱෩ = exp(−𝜇?̃?1) − exp[−(𝜇 + 𝜈)?̃?1] ,                 (6) 
 
and by equations (5) and (6), 
 
𝝀෨𝟏 
𝝀෨  
1 
0 
𝜫෩ 
0 
Initial expected probability for ?̃?  
Π 
𝝀෨𝟏 ?̃? 
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𝛱෩ = (
𝜇
𝜇+𝜈
)
𝜇
𝜈
− (
𝜇
𝜇+𝜈
)
𝜇+𝜈
𝜈
.                   (7) 
 
 Here, as s decreases, the value of μ in equation (1) increases because, as s 
decreases, the expected probability that all followers will make the same choice as that of 
the foremost household from the point of view of the expected utility (ΠU) will decrease 
for any given value of ?̃?. Hence, μ is a function of s such that  
 
𝜇 = ?̂?(𝑠)                             (8) 
 
and 
 
𝑑𝜇
𝑑𝑠
 < 0 .                            (9) 
 
By equations (7) and (8), ?̃? should satisfy 
 
 [
?̂?(?̃?)
?̂?(?̃?)+𝜈
]
?̂?(?̃?)
𝜈
− [
?̂?(?̃?)
?̂?(?̃?)+𝜈
]
?̂?(?̃?)+𝜈
𝜈
 = 𝛱෩ .              (10) 
 
If ?̃? is too small, 𝜇 = ?̂?(𝑠) becomes too large by inequality (9), and  
 
 lim
𝜇→∞
{[
?̂?(?̃?)
?̂?(?̃?) + 𝜈
]
?̂?(?̃?)
𝜈
− [
?̂?(?̃?)
?̂?(?̃?) + 𝜈
]
?̂?(?̃?)+𝜈
𝜈
} = 0 < 𝛱෩ , 
 
and if ?̃? is too large, 𝜇 = ?̂?(?̃?) becomes too small by inequality (9), and 
 
 lim
𝜇→0
{[
?̂?(?̃?)
?̂?(?̃?) + 𝜈
]
?̂?(?̃?)
𝜈
− [
?̂?(?̃?)
?̂?(?̃?) + 𝜈
]
?̂?(?̃?)+𝜈
𝜈
} = 0 < 𝛱෩ . 
 
Therefore, if ?̃? is too small or too large, equation (10) is not satisfied. Hence, ?̃? must be 
neither too small nor too large. If this condition is satisfied, 𝜇 = ?̂?(?̃?) is also neither too 
small nor too large, and   
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[
?̂?(?̃?)
?̂?(?̃?) + 𝜈
]
?̂?(?̃?)
𝜈
− [
?̂?(?̃?)
?̂?(?̃?) + 𝜈
]
?̂?(?̃?)+𝜈
𝜈
＝𝛱෩ > 0 
 
can hold unless 𝛱෩ is too large, because 
 
0 <
?̂?(?̃?)
?̂?(?̃?) + 𝜈
< 1 
 
and thereby 
 
 [
?̂?(?̃?)
?̂?(?̃?) + 𝜈
]
?̂?(?̃?)
𝜈
> [
?̂?(?̃?)
?̂?(?̃?) + 𝜈
]
?̂?(?̃?)+𝜈
𝜈
 . 
 
Therefore, unless 𝛱෩ is too large, an ?̃? that is neither too small nor too large exists. 
 Harashima (2009, 2018a) indicated that s is not too small or too large for 
reasonable parameter values in the model shown in Section 2. Hence, generally, 𝛱෩ will 
not be too large, and thereby an ?̃? that is not too small or too large will generally exist. 
 
3.6  Government Intervention 
Harashima (2017) showed that, if the government intervenes and utilizes bt (e.g., by 
increasing government consumption), the transition period s is prolonged because the 
adjustment of excess capital is delayed. Each time the government intervenes, households 
will recalculate the values of ?̃? and ?̃?1. Because the elimination of the excess capital is 
delayed by the government’s intervention, ?̃? will increase relative to the case when it 
does not intervene. Hence, if the government continues to intervene on a large scale for a 
long period, the eventual value of ?̃? will become very large and the transition period will 
be much longer.    
 
4  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Severe recessions like the Great Recession and the Great Depression probably persist for 
several years or more because it takes time to reach the posterior steady state after a shock. 
Because the cause of severe recessions remains unknown, the nature of the transition path 
during severe recessions has received little if any study. In this paper, the nature of the 
transition path was examined on the basis of the NEPIP. Because a NEPIP is not Pareto 
efficient, (i.e., the constraint that Pareto efficiency should be kept does not exist), an 
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infinite number of transition paths can be NEPIPs. Here, I examined the mechanism by 
which households select a NEPIP from among an infinite number of possible choices. 
 Households do not randomly select a NEPIP. Rather, they do so strategically and 
rationally considering the characteristics of each NEPIP. A reason for not choosing the 
Pareto efficient saddle path in the first place is that a household dislikes, fears and avoids 
the worst-case scenario, and the selection of a NEPIP from among many possible NEPIPs 
is also governed by this same preference. Households’ preferences for expected utility 
and worst-case aversion act in opposite directions in their selection of a NEPIP. A NEPIP 
is selected through a tug of war between these two opposite forces, and eventually a 
unique NEPIP will be selected by households. In addition, the length of the transition 
period will be uniquely determined endogenously and simultaneously, depending on the 
shape of the NEPIP.  
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